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INTRODUCTION
In the recent case of Haffejee NO & others v eThekwini Municipality & others
2011 (6) SA 134 (CC) (Haffejee), the Constitutional Court held that the
determination of compensation need not precede an expropriation; com-
pensation can in principle be determined after expropriation. The applicants
(hereafter referred to as ‘the Trust’) in Haffejee were the trustees of the YGM
Haffejee Family Trust, which owned property situated on the banks of the
Umgeni River in Durban. This property was earmarked to be expropriated
by the eThekwini Municipality for purposes of a canalisation programme to
ensure that the effects of ﬂooding of the river were minimised. In 2004, the
Municipality resolved to expropriate the Trust’s property and on 23 May
2005 a notice was sent to the Trust indicating the intention of the
Municipality to expropriate the property. Another notice was sent on
30 June 2005, ﬁxing the date of expropriation as 31 July 2005. Neither of
these notices contained any offer of compensation. Therefore, it is clear that
compensation had not been ﬁxed at the time that the expropriation had
taken place. In July 2006, the Municipality offered compensation at an
amount of eighty per cent of the market value of the property. The applicants
rejected the amount, because they questioned the validity of the expropria-
tion in terms of s 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Municipal-
ity instituted eviction proceedings and tendered payment of the full market
value of the property as compensation, which was also rejected by the Trust.
* This is a case note forming the background to a paper presented at the Property
Law Teachers’ Colloquium held in Windhoek, Namibia in October 2011. Thank
you to all the participants for discussions. I am indebted to André van der Walt and
Mikhalien du Bois for reading drafts of the note and for valuable feedback.
Remaining errors are my own.
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In the Kwazulu-Natal High Court the defences raised by the Trust were
rejected and the court granted the eviction order (see eThekwini Municipality
& others v Haffejee NO & others 2010 (6) BCLR 578 (KZD)). The Trust
unsuccessfully sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal from
the judge a quo (see eThekwini Municipality & others v Haffejee NO & others
[2010] ZAKZDHC 80 (25 August 2010)). Similarly, leave was sought by
petition to the Supreme Court of Appeal, but this was also refused, resulting
in an appeal to the Constitutional Court.
In the Constitutional Court, the Trust argued that compensation for
expropriation should be ﬁxed prior to the expropriation in order for the
requirement of s 25(2)(b) to be met (Haffejee para 20). In terms of s 25(2)(b),
‘[p]roperty may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application
— subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner
of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided
or approved by a court’.
The Trust stressed that an interpretation of s 25 that requires the ﬁxing of
compensation before expropriation would ensure that current SouthAfrican
property owners are not arbitrarily dispossessed of property in the same way
as dispossessions had occurred when no constitutional protection of property
existed. To this end, it was contended that subsecs 25(2) and (3) contain strict
requirements that ensure that compensation for expropriation meets the
standard of justice and equity and takes all relevant circumstances into
consideration. Furthermore, the Trust argued that on a plain reading of
s 25(2)(b) it is clear that, in principle, the payment of compensation can (and
mostly will) occur after the expropriation; however, an agreement with
regard to the amount of compensation and the time and manner of its
payment must be reached before the expropriation (para 21). On the basis of
these contentions, the Trust maintained that the expropriation process as
provided for in the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 was inconsistent with the
Constitution (see Haffejee para 21. It is clear that the Trust initially asserted —
but later abandoned — the contention that the provisions of the Expropria-
tion Act that allow for compensation to be determined after the date of
expropriation were in contravention of other provisions of the Constitution;
namely s 34 (the right of access to courts), s 9 (the right to equality) and s 33
(the right to just administrative action)).
By contrast, the Municipality resisted an interpretation of s 25(2)(b) of the
Constitution according to which the determination of compensation should
always precede the expropriation (para 22). The Municipality submitted that
such a reading of s 25(2)(b) would frustrate the Municipality’s obligations to
render basic services to residents, and would impede the transformative
socio-economic purposes of the Constitution (para 22), primarily because it
would cause unreasonable delays in the expropriation process, which would
disrupt the duties that the Municipality has in terms of the Constitution.
According to the Municipality, if this were tolerated, it would result in an
inequitable imbalance between the interests of the public and the interests of
the affected landowner. The Municipality also claimed that compensation
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would still be just and equitable in terms of subsecs 25(2) and (3) if
compensation were determined after the expropriation, as the owner of the
expropriated property is always entitled to just and equitable compensation,
regardless of whether that compensation is determined before or after the
expropriation.
The Constitutional Court concluded that although payment of compen-
sation is a constitutional requirement for the validity of an expropriation in
terms of s 25(2)(b), the determination of that compensation is not a
pre-condition for a valid expropriation (para 42). In this regard, the reason
that the court gave for choosing this interpretation, as opposed to the one
that requires pre-determination of compensation, was the undue burden that
pre-determination would place on the state (see para 42).
With this decision in mind, this note examines the South African position
regarding the appropriate time for the determination of compensation for
expropriation, which has until recently not been discussed. As a point of
departure it is necessary to distinguish between two aspects of compensation
for expropriation, namely the determination of compensation and its
payment, respectively. It will be shown that there are essential links between
these aspects (and the connection may be crucial for constitutional scrutiny),
but the two are fundamentally different matters of compensation that should
be distinguished from the outset.
An analysis of the process of expropriation as outlined in the Expropriation
Act follows after the outlining and identiﬁcation of the issue. The aim is to
question whether the provisions of the Act are constitutionally compliant in
so far as they relate to the appropriate time for ﬁxing compensation. In the
absence of clarity in the constitutional provision itself, it is necessary to
consider the interpretation expressed by the Constitutional Court in Haffejee,
speciﬁcally with regard to when compensation for expropriation should be
determined. Is this interpretation really what is anticipated by s 25(2)(b) with
regard to the requirement of compensation for expropriation? It is also
crucial to question the court’s interpretation of just and equitable compensa-
tion as described and required under s 25(3), as it relates to the proper time
for determining compensation.
With regard to the interpretation of s 25(2)(b), it is important in the ﬁrst
instance to look at Froneman J’s view of what constitutes ‘just and equitable’
compensation, and secondly to discuss brieﬂy the comparative law analysis
undertaken by the court. In the ﬁnal part, some thoughts are offered in
relation to whether this judgment necessarily changes the position regarding
compensation for expropriation; and, ultimately, whether the outcome in
Haffejee is indeed correct.
OUTLINING AND IDENTIFYING THE ISSUE
To begin with, a distinction should be drawn between the determination of
compensation for expropriation and the payment thereof. The Haffejee case
speciﬁcally dealt with the determination of the amount of compensation. In
fact, the Trust conceded that payment of compensation may take place after
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the expropriation, but insisted that the ﬁxing of the amount of compensation
should occur prior to the expropriation (para 21).
The Constitution provides reasonable clarity about the payment of
compensation. Section 25(2)(b) makes it clear that there are three aspects that
are important for purposes of compensation for expropriation, namely the
amount of compensation, its time of payment and its manner of payment. In
terms of s 25(2)(b), these aspects can either be agreed to by the parties
involved, or approved or decided by a court. With regard to the amount of
compensation, it is clear from subsecs 25(2) and (3) that the amount must be
just and equitable: in other words it should reﬂect an equitable balance
between the public interest and the interests of those affected by the
expropriation; and the amount of compensation must be of such a nature that
all relevant circumstances are taken into consideration, including (but not
limited to) those factors listed in s 25(3).
In terms of the time and manner of payment of compensation, s 25(2)(b)
states that this too should be just and equitable, and that all relevant
circumstances should be considered in order to establish when and how
compensation should be paid. It has been stated that in order for the time of
payment of compensation to be just and equitable in terms of subsecs 25(2)
and (3), prompt payment should follow after the expropriation has occurred
(see A J van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 509; Theunis
Roux ‘Property’ in Stu Woolman, Theunis Roux & Michael Bishop (eds)
Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 2 ed (Original Service, 2003)
46-34–46-35). Regarding the manner of payment of compensation, it is
generally accepted that money will form the mode of payment. However, it
should in principle be possible that compensation is paid in another form (see
Van derWalt Constitutional Property Law op cit at 509).
Therefore, it is evident that when dealing with issues concerning the
payment of compensation, subsecs 25(2) and (3) are reasonably clear.
However, these sub-sections are silent about when the decision concerning
the three aspects of compensation for expropriation should be resolved. In
this regard, the Expropriation Act is clearer. The next part of this note
discusses the process of expropriation of property in terms of this Act, which
provides for the possibility that compensation can be ﬁxed after expropria-
tion has taken place (see s 2(1)). It is therefore important to set out the process
of expropriation in terms of the Act, in order to establish whether the
provisions are constitutionally compliant in so far as they allow for compen-
sation to be determined after an expropriation.
THE PROCESS OF EXPROPRIATION IN TERMS OF THE
EXPROPRIATION ACT
In terms of the Expropriation Act, the process of expropriation occurs as
follows (see Haffejee paras 15–16). If the Minister decides to expropriate, he
must, in terms of s 7(1) of the Act, serve the notice of expropriation on the
owner being expropriated. The notice should contain a description of the
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property being expropriated (ss 10(1) and 7(2)(a)), the supposed date of
expropriation, and also the date on which the state will take possession of the
property (s 7(2)(b)). In the discretion of the Minister, the notice may also
contain an offer of compensation (s 7(2)(d)). If it does, the notice should alert
the owner to the fact that he has sixty days within which to respond to the
offer by written statement indicating whether he accepts or rejects the offer
(ss 7(2)(c) and 9(1)). If the owner does not respond to the offer of
compensation contained in the notice, or the written statement does not
contain the information as required in terms of s 7(2) of theAct, the Minister
can apply to an appropriate court to determine a suitable amount of
compensation in the particular case. However, if the owner does respond,
but rejects the offer of compensation made by the Minister, the owner should
react by indicating the amount claimed by him as compensation and also how
the amount is calculated (s 9(1)(a)). If the Minister is not prepared to pay this
amount, he is obliged to make another offer within a reasonable time in
terms of s 10(4) of the Act. However, if the owner does not accept this ﬁnal
offer, the Minister can apply to an appropriate court to determine a suitable
amount of compensation in the particular instance.
On the other hand, a different course of action follows if no offer of
compensation is made in the notice (ss 9(1)(b) and 10(2)). If this occurs, the
owner has sixty days after the notice was received to respond to the
notiﬁcation. In his written response, the owner must indicate the amount he
claims as compensation (s 9(1)). If the Minister is not prepared to pay the
amount sought, he must make another offer within a reasonable time, after
which the owner has thirty days to respond to this offer indicating its
acceptance or rejection (s 10(4)). If no settlement is reached, the Minister can
apply to an appropriate court to decide on a suitable amount of compensa-
tion.
In this process, it is important to note that the expropriation is deemed to
take place on the date mentioned in the notice (s 8). When the expropriation
occurs, ownership of the expropriated property vests in the state by way of
original acquisition of ownership, irrespective of whether the owner con-
sents or disagrees. From the process, it is clear that compensation can be ﬁxed
after the date of expropriation, especially in instances where the parties
cannot agree on the amount of compensation and the court is left to decide
an appropriate amount in the particular case. The question that arises in these
instances is whether the provisions of the Expropriation Act are consistent
with s 25(2)(b), especially in light of the fact that s 25(2)(b) does not explicitly
mention when compensation should be determined. In order to answer
questions in this regard, it may be appropriate at this stage to provide a brief
discussion of the SouthAfrican literature (or lack thereof) on this point.
SOUTH AFRICAN SOURCES
The writings of South African authors are for the most part mute about the
time when compensation for expropriation should be agreed upon. Gilden-
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huys & Grobler do not directly state that compensation can be determined
after the expropriation in terms of the Expropriation Act (see Antonie
Gildenhuys & Gerrit Grobler ‘Expropriation’ in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of
South Africa vol 10 (1980)). However, the authors do provide an enquiry into
the procedure of expropriation in terms of the Act (see Gildenhuys &
Grobler in LAWSA op cit paras 28–36). From this enquiry, it is clear that the
Act provides for the Minister to pay the amount of compensation that was
offered to the owner, even if at that stage the owner has not yet accepted the
offer (Gildenhuys & Grobler in LAWSA op cit para 36). This will ordinarily
occur after the date of expropriation but prior to the determination of the
amount of compensation, which means that it is possible that compensation
may only be determined subsequent to the expropriation (ibid).
Jacobs & Gildenhuys discuss the signiﬁcant aspects concerning the
measure and method for determining compensation for expropriation in
SouthAfrican law (see Marcus Jacobs &Antonie Gildenhuys ‘Expropriation’
in South Africa’ in G M Erasmus (ed) Compensation for Expropriation: A
Comparative Study Volume I (1990) 373 at 377–88). Again, the authors do not
unequivocally conﬁrm that it is possible in terms of the Act to allow
compensation to be determined after the expropriation. However, the
possibility is not entirely eliminated in terms of their breakdown of the
process of expropriation in terms of the Act either. This is because the actual
payment of compensation will generally take place at a much later date,
especially if the parties cannot agree on compensation and the dispute is taken
to court and resolved by litigation, which (according to the authors) usually
occurs after the date of expropriation (Jacobs & Gildenhuys op cit at 379).
Therefore, it may be that the expropriation can occur ﬁrst, and the
calculation of the compensation amount at a later stage.
More recently, Gildenhuys has noted that compensation serves to replace
the expropriated property (seeAntonie Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 2 ed (2001)
151). For that reason, he emphasises the replacement role of compensation,
as opposed to the justiﬁcatory role that the public purpose/public interest
requirement plays in expropriation law (Gildenhuys op cit at 151). He
conﬁrms that payment of compensation is not a pre-requisite for the vesting
of ownership, and distinguishes between the validity of the expropriation
and the acquisition or vesting of ownership (ibid). In this regard, it is clear
that the expropriation (in other words, the date on which ownership of the
expropriated property vests in the state) can take place before compensation
is paid, the latter being an issue concerning the validity of the expropriation
rather than the vesting of ownership. Regrettably, Gildenhuys does not
comment on whether the determination of compensation should occur prior
to the date of expropriation, or whether it may be settled thereafter.
In Constitutional Law of South Africa, Roux does not identify when in the
process of expropriation compensation should be speciﬁed either (Roux op
cit at 46-34–46-36). By the same token, Van der Walt, in the recently revised
Constitutional Property Law, does not mention whether s 25(2)(b) actually
requires that the determination of compensation should occur ahead of the
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expropriation. However, Van der Walt does indicate that the Haffejee case
conﬁrms that s 25 does not require that compensation should always be
calculated before the expropriation (see Van der Walt Constitutional Property
Law op cit at 509). Interestingly, both Van der Walt and Roux point out that
payment of compensation should occur as soon as possible after the expropria-
tion, because a long delay in paying compensation will not be just and
equitable in terms of the requirements in subsecs 25(2) and (3) (see Van der
Walt Constitutional Property Law ibid; Roux op cit at 46–34). However, this
still does not resolve the challenge in expropriation law regarding when
compensation should be determined. In the absence of clarity in this regard,
Froneman J in Haffejee was required to determine whether the provisions of
the ExpropriationAct were constitutionally valid in so far as they allowed for
compensation to be determined after the expropriation. To this end, he set
out to determine the most likely interpretation of s 25(2)(b) in the speciﬁc
case. The interpretation of s 25(2)(b) as applied in Haffejee forms the core of
the discussion below.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 25(2)(b)
FNB as authority for analysing section 25
The Constitutional Court in Haffejee started the interpretation of s 25 by
emphasising that First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner,
South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Minister of
Finance 2002 (4) SA768 (CC) (FNB) should be used as the point of departure
when undertaking an analysis of s 25 (para 25). In this respect, FNB provides
a structural analysis that makes interpretation of s 25 more manageable (see
FNB (supra) para 46). In terms of FNB there are certain crucial questions that
need to be asked in the context of s 25. In the ﬁrst place, it needs to be
established whether the interest in the particular case constitutes property
that requires protection in terms of s 25. Thereafter, it should be determined
whether the infringement of the property or property rights caused depriva-
tion in terms of its s 25(1) meaning. If deprivation results, it must be in terms
of law of general application and it may not be arbitrary. With regard to the
arbitrariness requirement in s 25(1), the Constitutional Court held in FNB
that deprivation of property is arbitrary when there is insufﬁcient reason for
it, or if it is procedurally unfair (FNB (supra) para 100). Only if it is
established that the deprivation was not arbitrary, or the deprivation was
arbitrary but could be justiﬁed under s 36, can scrutiny in terms of subsecs
25(2) and (3) be undertaken (ibid).
A very important result of the FNB decision for future cases dealing with
potential infringements of s 25 is that all limitations on property rights that
may result in constitutional infringement in terms of s 25 must ﬁrst comply
with the requirements of s 25(1) before it can be established whether the
alleged contravention affects subsecs 25(2) and (3) (FNB (supra) paras 60 and
100. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit at 219–20; Roux
op cit at 46-23–46-25). Therefore, in terms of the methodology provided in
NOTES 611
FNB, even if the question in any given case relates speciﬁcally to the
possibility of an invalid expropriation in terms of subsecs 25(2) and (3), it
must ﬁrst comply with the test for deprivation of property in terms of s 25(1)
(FNB (supra) para 60; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit at
219–20. See also A J van der Walt 2011 (3) JQR Constitutional Property Law
2.2.1, where Van der Walt indicates that the court failed to recognise the
academic argument of Roux that an expropriation that has passed the
non-arbitrariness test of s 25(1) cannot seriously be questioned for non-
compliance with subsecs 25(2) or (3)). It may have been signiﬁcant in this
regard to have seen whether the expropriation would have passed the
scrutiny of s 25(1) in terms of the non-arbitrariness test if the court had been
more thorough in its s 25(1) analysis. Perhaps it would not have made a
difference, but even then the fact that it would not have made a difference
substantially inﬂuences the argument related to Roux’s contention. There-
fore, the fact that the court did not give any recognition to the arbitrariness
vortex argument when interpreting s 25 (and purportedly following the FNB
methodology) casts doubt on the court’s interpretation of s 25(1). The result
is that if the deprivation is arbitrary and it cannot be justiﬁed, the enquiry
stops there and the law that causes the deprivation would be invalid. The
question concerning expropriation of property, and whether the expropria-
tion complies with the requirements of subsecs 25(2) and (3), would not arise
in the above-mentioned cases. However, if the deprivation is not arbitrary, or
it is arbitrary but justiﬁed, the question concerning expropriation must be
considered.With the FNB case in mind, the Haffejee court set out to interpret
s 25(2)(b) (see Haffejee para 27).
Froneman J began by assuming that the interest in question qualiﬁed as
property for purposes of s 25 and by accepting that there was deprivation of
property. The court also acknowledged that the deprivation was in terms of
law of general application as required under s 25(1) (ibid), and accepted that
the deprivation was not arbitrary in terms of s 25(1). Hence, it qualiﬁed as
expropriation that complied with the public purpose/public interest require-
ment in terms of s 25(2)(a). Accordingly, the court held that the only
question that still required attention was whether the expropriation complied
with s 25(2)(b). To this end, the court set out general principles of interpreta-
tion of s 25 in order to establish the best possible interpretation of s 25(2)(b)
about the time at which compensation for expropriation should be deter-
mined. This was necessary because the provision itself does not provide
clarity in this regard.
Purposive interpretation of s 25 in line with FNB
In line with FNB, the Haffejee court mentioned some important general
aspects of the interpretation of s 25. Using what is commonly referred to as
purposive interpretation, the court stated in the ﬁrst place that any challenge
to s 25 should always begin with s 25(1) (Haffejee para 29). Secondly, it
emphasised that when interpreting s 25, the section should be seen in the
context of the values that are enshrined in the Constitution as a whole (see
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paras 29–31 and also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit ch 2). In
other words, interpretation of s 25 should aim at enhancing the ‘values that
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom’ (Haffejee para 29), and should give due consideration to
international and foreign law as required in terms of s 39(1) of the Constitu-
tion. In this regard, international law must be considered and foreign law
may be considered. Furthermore, when pre-constitutional law is applicable
during interpretation (as in Haffejee) that law should be approached with
circumspection. With regard to interpretation of s 25, it is also important that
due recognition should be given to the apparent tension that exists between
the protection of existing property rights (as guaranteed in terms of subsecs
25(1)–(3)) and the need for redress and transformation to address the unequal
distribution of property (as mandated in terms of subsecs 25(4)–(9)) (Haffejee
para 31). This requires particular sensitivity towards the historical context of
the constitutional provision as well as the Constitution as a whole. This also
calls for a context-sensitive approach that will ensure that a proportionate
balance is struck between protecting private property rights and serving the
public interest. Ultimately, this necessitates the conviction that property
rights are not absolute and can be limited depending on societal consider-
ations (Haffejee para 30). With these general principles in mind, the court set
out to interpret s 25(2)(b).
In doing so, it emphasised that an interpretation of the subsection could
not preclude the possibility that the decision concerning compensation
should precede the expropriation, or a ﬂexible interpretation that allows for
the determination of compensation to follow the expropriation (Haffejee para
35). Froneman J opined that both these interpretations are plausible. In this
regard, the decision about whether compensation should be determined
beforehand is context-sensitive and must be made according to the circum-
stances of the particular case. The court acknowledged that there may be
strong arguments for and against an interpretation that requires compensa-
tion to be determined before the expropriation. However, according to
Froneman J, when an interpretation of ‘just and equitable’ compensation is
considered, it may not be too difﬁcult to see that an inﬂexible requirement of
compensation before expropriation would be unsustainable in certain
instances; for example where the expropriation is urgent, as in the case of
natural disasters (paras 39–40). Therefore, the public interest may in some
instances necessitate compensation not having been determined beforehand.
However, there are also instances where it may be clear that it would be
unjust not to determine compensation beforehand, such as instances where
people may upon eviction lose their homes or livelihoods without compen-
sation having been resolved before the eviction (Haffejee para 40).
The court concluded that it was faced with a decision in the particular case
regarding which of the two possible interpretations was more compatible
with the Constitution as a whole. It was eventually persuaded by the fact that
making the determination of compensation a pre-condition for expropria-
tion would burden the state unduly in the sense that the issue of compensa-
NOTES 613
tion would always have to settled before expropriation has taken place (para
42). Therefore it held that s 25(2)(b) of the Constitution does not require that
the determination of the amount of compensation and the time and manner
of payment thereof should precede the expropriation (para 27). The court
highlighted that compensation that is determined beforehand will generally
be just and equitable, as is required in terms of s 25(3), but compensation
determined after expropriation will not per se be invalid. However, if the
compensation is determined subsequent to the expropriation, it should be
determined reasonably quickly thereafter. And, very importantly, the court
made it clear that should eviction follow upon the expropriation, it must
either be agreed to by the parties or decided (and ordered) by court (para 43).
Besides the purposive interpretation of s 25 applied in the case, it is also
interesting to consider the court’s reliance on comparative law. In this regard,
the judgment is actually quite problematic.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Use of comparative analysis in Haffejee
Subsections 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution require that a court, tribunal
or forum must consider international law and may consider foreign law when
interpreting the Bill of Rights (Haffejee para 34.). Van der Walt (Constitutional
Property Law op cit at 27–8) writes:
‘The purpose of reference to foreign law should be, ﬁrstly, to note the problems
of interpretation and application that have already been uncovered there, and
secondly to observe and analyse different approaches, arguments, tendencies
and trends in the solution of those problems, while remaining careful to ensure
that the interpretation and application of section 25 is suited to current, local
needs and demands, within the historical, social and political context of South
African legal development.’
He adds that ‘comparative analysis for the sake of comparison is senseless:
comparative analysis should bring some beneﬁt in the form of new solutions
and alternatives or greater clarity (even when it is of no more assistance than
avoiding errors made in other jurisdictions or understanding when and why
foreign law is not useful on a speciﬁc point)’ (ibid). Keeping in mind this basic
premise as to why comparative law is important for constitutional interpreta-
tion, it is interesting to consider the use of comparative law in the Haffejee
case with the aim of determining whether it added any real value to the
investigation.
In Haffejee the court stated that comparative law was inconclusive with
regard to the question of the determination of compensation for expropria-
tion (para 34). The court mentioned that it obtained its research for the
comparative analysis from the Venice Commission, of which the court is a
member (para 34n37)). Based on this research, it recognised that some
jurisdictions require that the determination of compensation should precede
the expropriation, whereas other jurisdictions do not (ibid). The court then
proceeded to list numerous jurisdictions with property clauses where no
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mention is made about when compensation for expropriation should be
determined, eventually coming to the conclusion that the approaches in
these jurisdictions were unhelpful (para 34).
The difﬁculty with this type of comparative analysis is that it does not
effectively take the issue any further than showing that there is a problem,
and that the problem also exists in other jurisdictions. What would perhaps
have been of greater assistance in this case is an analysis of how the clauses of
the relevant jurisdictions are interpreted (and applied) in the respective
countries with regard to the question of the determination of compensation
for expropriation. Therefore, the type of comparative analysis that may have
been useful would have been a comparison with jurisdictions that also have
constitutional expropriation provisions that do not explicitly provide that
compensation should always be determined before the expropriation, and an
assessment of how the courts in those jurisdictions deal with those clauses.An
example of a jurisdiction that may be worthwhile to consider in this regard
would be Malaysia. For reasons discussed below, it seems as though Malaysia
may provide some useful insight into how the South African property clause
should be interpreted, speciﬁcally with reference to when compensation for
expropriation should be determined.
Interesting comparative exploration: The Malaysian position
The Malaysian property clause is found in art 13 of the Federal Constitution
of Malaysia, 1957.Article 13 provides:
‘(1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law.
(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property
without adequate compensation.’
It is clear that the property clause in the Malaysian Constitution is similar
to its South African counterpart. Generally, this makes comparative analysis
with Malaysia very fruitful. A distinction is drawn in Malaysian law between
two situations: state interferences where the limitation results in possible
deprivation of property which should be in accordance with law in terms of
the so-called police power of the state; and state interferences that cause
compulsory acquisition or use of property according to the power of eminent
domain, which has the additional requirement of adequate compensation (A
J van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (1999)
266–7).
The power of compulsory acquisition enshrined in clause 2 of art 13 is
similar to the expropriatory power in South African law. Clause 2 of art 13
is less descriptive than its South African equivalent in terms of compensation
for compulsory acquisition: all that is provided is that adequate compensation
should accompany compulsory acquisitions. The ambit of the requirement of
adequate compensation is not deﬁned or explained in the clause. Therefore,
the provision itself does not stipulate when compensation should be deter-
mined (or paid) in order for the standard of adequate compensation to be met.
However, Malaysia has legislation regulating acquisitions which is similar
to the SouthAfrican ExpropriationAct. The Malaysian LandAcquisitionAct
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of 1960 regulates the acquisition of land, the assessment of compensation to
be made in account of such acquisition, and all other matters incidental
thereto. TheAct also provides a procedure that has to be followed in the case
of acquisition of land by the state and requires that a Land Administrator
should hold an inquiry to determine the compensation award (s 10).
However, the Act does not specify exactly when this inquiry should be held
in order for the acquisition to be valid. The case of Pemungut Hasil Tanah,
Daerah Barat Daya, Pulau Pinang v Ong Gaik Kee [1983] 2 MLJ 35 is
interesting in this regard. This case dealt with the appropriate time for
holding an inquiry to determine the amount of compensation for compul-
sory acquisitions.
The Federal Court in Pemungut Hasil Tanah had to determine whether a
delay of seven years, measured from the declaration of acquisition to the
holding of the inquiry to determine the compensation award, was in conﬂict
with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (Pemungut Hasil Tanah
(supra) para 12). The court found that the long delay prejudiced the
landowner, which in turn caused the acquisition to be in conﬂict with the
Act, although the Act did not specify the time-frame within which the
inquiry should be held (ibid para 18). The court also acknowledged that the
longer the delay in making the inquiry, the greater the injustice to the
landowner, creating the likelihood that the acquisition would be in conﬂict
with theAct because the compensation was not determined timeously (ibid).
Interestingly, the Judicial Commissioner in the High Court commented on
the fact that a delay in holding an inquiry to determine the compensation
award would no doubt result in inadequate compensation that would be in
violation of clause 2 of art 13, which requires adequate compensation for
compulsory acquisitions. However, this was not seriously considered in the
Federal Court because the court merely interpreted the LandAcquisitionAct
in order to establish when compensation should be determined in order for
the acquisition to be in line with the Act. Consequently, the Federal Court
interpreted adequate compensation as requiring that compensation should be
determined reasonably quickly after the expropriation notice, even if the Act
does not specify a time within which the inquiry should be held.
What is interesting in terms of the comparative value of the Malaysian
position is the court’s interpretation of s 10 of the Land Acquisition Act. As
mentioned earlier, neither clause 2 of art 13 nor s 10 of the Act is clear about
when the inquiry into the compensation award should be held. In the
absence of clarity, the court was faced with the question whether the delay
was acceptable in the particular case. The court used s 38 of the Interpreta-
tion of General Clauses Ordinance of 1948 to interpret s 10 of the Land
Acquisition Act. In this regard, the court emphasised that if an Act does not
speciﬁcally stipulate a time by which something should be done, it can be
assumed that it should be ‘done with all convenient speed, equating ‘‘all
convenient speed’’with ‘‘as soon as possible’’ and ‘‘within a reasonable time’’ ’
(Pemungut Hasil Tanah ibid para 17). Furthermore, it was stressed that ‘all
convenient speed’will depend on the particular case. It is clear that the Land
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Administrator is unable to prolong or delay the ﬁxing of the compensation
award unreasonably. The court stated that ‘[b]y providing no time limit
within which the Collector should hold an inquiry the legislator leaves the
discretion in the matter to the Collector, but it is certainly not its intention
that the Collector shall be free to use it at any time he chooses to inquire at
the expense of the land owner or regardless of his right’ (ibid para 18).
In my view, the court in Haffejee would have reached the same conclusion
it did had it considered the interpretation of the provisions in the Malaysian
Land Acquisition Act to establish whether s 25(2)(b) was contravened.
However, the Malaysian position regarding the determination of compensa-
tion would have been of much greater assistance than the actual comparative
analysis undertaken by the court.
It should be noted, though, that the possible reason why the comparative
law analysis done in Haffejee was inconclusive was because the court
considered the jurisdictions it referred to in light of the question of when
compensation should be paid and not when the compensation should be
determined, an all-important distinction that was illustrated towards the
beginning of this note. The failure to distinguish these two aspects makes it
difﬁcult to establish when compensation should be determined so that the
expropriation is still in line with s 25(2)(b). As was mentioned earlier, it is
imperative to separate the aspects in order to question whether it would be in
line with s 25(2)(b) to determine compensation after the expropriation. This
argument is reinforced in the next part of this note.
DOES HAFFEJEE NECESSARILY CHANGE THE POSITION
CONCERNING COMPENSATION FOR EXPROPRIATION?
It seems unlikely that this judgment fundamentally changes the position
concerning compensation for expropriation. Practically and legally, it appears
to make no difference whether compensation is determined prior to the
expropriation, or thereafter. The support for this contention is based on the
fact that the requirement of s 25(2)(b) is only fulﬁlled upon payment of
compensation, and not the determination thereof. It should be kept in mind
that payment of compensation may occur after expropriation, as long as the
time of payment of compensation is still just and equitable in the particular
case. Therefore, to the extent that s 25(2)(b) is unclear about when compen-
sation should be determined, the guideline for payment of compensation in
every individual case should inform the decision about whether the time of
determining the compensation is constitutional. This may be demonstrated
by using a hypothetical example of what would ordinarily occur in the case
of the expropriation of property.
If one considers a time line (or continuum), plotting the events that
typically take place during the process of expropriation, there are three very
important points that should be highlighted on this time line. In the ﬁrst
place (most likely at a point illustrated on the far left of the time line) would
be the notice of expropriation, which we assume to be point A. At point A,
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knowledge of the expropriation will most likely be communicated for the
ﬁrst time to the owner of the property being expropriated. The second point
(point B) on the imaginary time line would be the date of expropriation,
which will most likely be plotted to the right of (ie later than) the notice of
expropriation. This is the date on which ownership of the expropriated
property vests in the state. From what generally occurs in the case of
expropriation, there is a point on the time line to the right of (ie later than)
the date of expropriation (point B) where compensation for expropriation is
paid to the owner that was expropriated (point C). On the time line there are
now three points namely, point A (the notiﬁcation date), point B (the date of
expropriation) and point C (the date of payment of compensation).
In addition, there are important caveats that should be mentioned about
the time line. First, C can (and mostly will) occur after B. In other words,
payment of compensation in most instances occurs after the expropriation
(see Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law op cit at 509; Roux op cit at
46-34). Secondly, it should be possible in principle in some instances to
require that C should occur prior to B. This would depend on the
circumstances of the case and a proportionate balance being struck between
the interest of the landowner affected by the expropriation and the public
interest. Therefore, if needs be, compensation should be paid before the
expropriation. In the third place, if C occurs after B, the period between
B and C should be reasonably short. This will ensure that the time of
payment of compensation will be just and equitable, as s 25(2)(b) requires.
Finally, the requirement of s 25(2)(b) is only fulﬁlled once C has taken place.
Therefore, if compensation is paid before the date of expropriation, the
requirement of s 25(2)(b) will be fulﬁlled before ownership of the expropri-
ated property vests in the state whereas, if compensation is paid after the date
of expropriation, the requirement of s 25(2)(b) is only satisﬁed after owner-
ship vests in the state.
This being said, the question that now becomes important for consider-
ation is where on the time line the determination of compensation (point D)
should be plotted. More importantly, it needs to be established whether point
D should always be to the left of (earlier than) point B, where compensation
is at all times determined before expropriation, or whether point D may
occur after (later than) point B, which allows for the possibility that
compensation is determined after the expropriation. My argument is that the
answer in every speciﬁc case lies with point C; the point at which
compensation for the expropriated property is paid to the affected land-
owner.
If in the particular case it is in the public interest to pay compensation
before the expropriation, naturally the determination of compensation
should also occur before the expropriation (requiring points C and D to be
plotted before point B). However, if compensation may be paid after the
expropriation in the particular case, nothing precludes the possibility that the
determination of compensation may also occur after the expropriation
(allowing points C and D to be plotted after point B). It should be kept in
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mind, as is mentioned as one of the caveats above, that the requirement of
s 25(2)(b) is only fulﬁlled upon payment of compensation (point C).
Therefore, if we concede that payment of compensation for expropriation
may occur after the expropriation, then we should in principle be willing to
accept that the determination of compensation can also in certain instances
take place after the date of expropriation. As long as the determination of
compensation occurs before the payment of compensation (which it obvi-
ously will) it still complies with the requirement in s 25(2)(b).
In essence, the fact that compensation must be paid reasonably quickly
after the expropriation forms a safety net to prevent instances where the state
unreasonably prolongs the determination of compensation and the subse-
quent payment thereof. Therefore, the property right of the person whose
property is being expropriated is protected against long delays in the ﬁxing of
compensation, because this will also prolong the payment thereof, which
may result in the time of payment of compensation not being just and
equitable in terms of s 25(2)(b).
Although this argument was not raised in Haffejee, it may be a way of
explaining why the court went the route that it did by stating that s 25(2)(b)
should be interpreted in a ﬂexible manner that does not require that
compensation should always be determined before expropriation. However,
there is a very important qualiﬁcation to be made if the rationale and
approach to the interpretation of s 25(2)(b), as emphasised in Haffejee, are to
be followed. It should be noted that what would be deemed just and
equitable would depend on the relevant circumstances in the particular
instance. In other words, in order to determine what would amount to just
and equitable time of payment of compensation — and the concomitant
determination thereof — will depend on the circumstances of the particular
case. When considering the circumstances of the particular case, due
recognition should be given to instances where eviction of the former owner
will take place before compensation for expropriation has been determined.
This concern has been raised as a point of criticism against the decision
(see L Kotzé ‘Expropriation: The Constitutional Court decides’ available
at http://www.timeslive.co.za/ilive/2011/10/13/expropriation-the-constitutional-
court-decides-ilive, accessed on 18 January 2012). In this regard, Kotzé writes that
‘land owners could ﬁnd themselves in a situation where they [have] been
evicted from their land and are without a place of residence or an income
generating asset until such time as agreement is reached in respect of the
compensation to be paid to them’(ibid). However, Froneman Jmade it clear in
Haffejee that eviction following expropriation may not take place unless it is
agreed upon between the parties to the expropriation; or, in the absence of
agreement, it may only take place under court supervision (Haffejee para 43).
Therefore, the eviction of an expropriatee who is unwilling to vacate the
expropriated property after the date of expropriation may only occur if there is
judicial oversight.
This judicial oversight will ensure a separation between two distinct
situations. The ﬁrst is where the person whose property is being expropriated
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may have a legitimate reason for refusing to vacate — for example in cases
where he risks losing his primary residence or livelihood — and the need to
determine compensation beforehand is more demanding. The other extreme
may occur where the person whose property is being expropriated is trying
unjustiﬁably (and in conﬂict with what would be in the best interest of the
public) to prolong the process of expropriation by ensuring that the
expropriation cannot proceed until compensation is determined. Judicial
oversight will guarantee that just and equitable outcomes are reached that are
in accordance with ss 25(3) and 26(3) of the Constitution, and will ensure
that the rights of the affected landowner are not unjustiﬁably prejudiced
during the expropriation process.
CONCLUSION
This note provides some insights into the issue concerning when compensa-
tion for expropriation should be determined in order for an expropriation to
comply with s 25(2)(b) of the Constitution. The question that was investi-
gated was whether the Haffejee judgment fundamentally changed the law
regulating compensation for expropriation. More speciﬁcally, it was neces-
sary to investigate whether s 25(2)(b) implicitly requires that compensation
for expropriation be determined before the expropriation, or whether (as
Haffejee ultimately conﬁrmed) a ﬂexible approach should be followed that
will allow for the possibility that compensation is ﬁxed subsequent to the
expropriation.
It is argued here that the outcome of the case cannot be faulted. To the
extent that s 25(2)(b) does not provide clarity about when compensation for
expropriation should be determined, it would have to be deduced that the
time of payment of compensation should inform the constitutionality of the
time of the determination thereof. The assumption is that if the time of
payment of compensation is just and equitable, any time of determination of
compensation that occurs before that, will also be just and equitable. This is
because the requirement of s 25(2)(b) is only fulﬁlled upon payment of
compensation and not the determination thereof. This should be said with
the qualiﬁcation that if eviction is a serious option in the particular instance, it
should either be agreed to by the parties, or decided or approved by a court.
In this regard, the court in Haffejee made the position concerning eviction
clear and eliminated some of the resistance against the outcome. Therefore,
in my view, the outcome in Haffejee cannot be criticised, and any doubts
expressed about the judgment are perhaps instinctive, rather than being
well-reasoned.
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